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Sources of Occupational Wage Differentials 
in a «Compétitive» Labour Market 
C. J. Bruce 
and 
J. D. Cheslak 
The authors présent a survey of the wage-setting practices 
of a number of employers of clerk-typists in the city of 
Calgary to provide additional information concerning the 
déterminants of extra-market wage differentials. 
Since the publication of George Stigler's classic article, «Informa-
tion in the Labor Market»!, the theory of the job search has been one 
of the major growth areas in labour économies.2 Each of the models 
developed in this literature has been based on the assumption that wage 
differentials exist within localised labour markets for homogeneous 
workers, thereby presenting the unemployed worker with an array of 
potential wage-offers from which to choose. 
The existence of such wage differentials, even between workers 
within finely-defined occupations in the same labour market, has been 
well documented. For example, Labour Canada, in its publication, 
Wage Rates, Salaries, and Hours of Labour3, identifies average weekly 
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1
 G. STIGLER, «Information in the Labour Market», Journal of Political 
Economy, Supplément, Vol. 70, No. 5, Pt. 2, October 1962, pp. 94-105. 
2
 Cf. D. T. MORTENSEN, «Job Search, the Duration of Unemployment, and 
the Phillips' Curve», American Economie Review, Vol. 60, No. 5, December 1970, 
pp. 847-862; C. C. HOLT, «Improving the Labor Market Trade-Off Between Inflation 
and Unemployment», American Economie Association, Vol. 59, No. 2, May 1969, pp. 135-
146; and R. GRONAU, «Information and Frictional Unemployment», American Economie 
Review, Vol. 61, No. 3, June 1971, pp. 290-301. 
3
 Labour Canada, Wage Rates, Salaries, and Hours of Work, Ottawa, (annual). 
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wages and first and ninth décile wages for a wide variety of occupations 
on a city-by-city basis. Thèse data clearly indicate that the différence 
between the first and ninth décile wages is often greater than thirty 
percent of the average wage rate.4 
However, although such wage differentials are commonly observed, 
and play a crucial rôle in théories of the job search, they also appear 
to be inconsistent with the neoclassical theory of the opération of 
compétitive labour markets. In spite of this, relatively little work has 
been done, either theoretically or empirically, to explain why thèse wage 
differentials are so great and so persistent. We know of no published 
works which provide a neoclassical theory of persistant wage differentials 
within a compétitive labour market for homogeneous workers, other than 
those which rely on the assumption of imperfect information on the 
part of both employers and workers.5 Furthermore, while there hâve 
been a number of studies which hâve investigated several déterminants 
of intramarket wage differentials6, we know of only one such study 
which has attempted to deal with thèse déterminants simultaneously 
using multiple linear régression analysis.7 
4
 For example, even when the occupation normally referred to as «Clerk-
typist» is broken down into eight sub-categories, the inter-decile range divided by the 
average wage does not fall below .3 for any category in the city of Calgary. The eight 
occupations referred to (with interdecile ranges divided by average wages) are: gênerai 
office clerk, junior (.38), gênerai office clerk, intermediate (.41), typist, junior (.32), 
typist, senior (.39), secretary, junior (.38), secretary, senior (.37), stenographer, Junior 
(.35), stenographer, senior (.30). (Each of the occupations referred to included only 
fe maies. The data was collected in October, 1974 and there were no fewer than 220 
observations for any group.) 
5
 cf. M. R. FISHER, « Search in Labor Markets — A Human Capital Perspec-
tive », Intermountain Economie Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, Fall 1974, pp. 1-16; and L. J. MIR-
MAN and W. R. PORTER, «A Microeconomic Model of the Labor Market Under 
Uncertainty », Economie Inquiry, Vol. 12, No. 2, June 1974, pp. 135-145. 
6
 cf. D. I. MACKAY, et. al., Labour Markets Under Différent Employment 
Conditions, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1971; R. EVANS, Jr., «Worker Quality 
and Wage Dispersion: An analysis of a Clérical Labor Market in Boston», Industrial 
Relations Research Association, Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Meeting, I4th 
Annual Meeting, Dec. 28-29, 1961, New York City, Madison, Wis.: IRRA, 1961, pp. 246-
259; E. H. CONAN, «Worker Efficiency and Wage Differentials in a Clérical Labour 
Market», Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 16, No. 3, April 1963, pp. 428-433; 
and G. P. SHULTZ, «A Nonunion Market for White Collar Labor» ; in National Bureau 
for Economie Research, Aspects of Labor Economies, Princeton University Press, Prince-
ton, 1962, pp. 107-146. 
7
 A. REES and G. P. SHULTZ, Workers and Wages in an Urban Labor Market, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970. 
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Given the importance of the présence of intra-market wage differ-
entials to the theory of the job search, and the seeming inconsistency of 
the présence of such differentials with conventional wage theory, it is 
our feeling that the paucity of information concerning this subject is 
entirely unwarranted. Accordingly, we hâve undertaken a survey of the 
wage-setting practices of a number of employers of clerk-typists in the 
city of Calgary to provide additional information concerning the déter-
minants of intra-market wage differentials. Analysis of the results of 
this survey are reported in this paper. 
The paper is divided into three sections. In the first section we 
briefly survey the literature on the détermination of wage differentials. 
In the second section we describe our survey and analyse the resulting 
data. And, finally, we présent our conclusions concerning the présence 
of intra-market wage differentials. 
THÉORIES OF INTRA-MARKET WAGE DIFFERENTIALS 
Two bodies of theory concerning the sources of intra-market wage 
differentials can be identified. The first of thèse we will refer to as 
"neoclassical theory". This is the body of theory which is consistent 
with the assumptions that firms seek to maximise long-run profits and 
that workers seek to maximise long-run net économie advantages, sub-
ject to the constraint that there may be costs associated with the 
acquisition of information. The second body of theory we shall refer to 
as « institutional theory ». This is composed of théories which are based 
either on the assumption that firms do not attempt to maximise profits 
or on the assumption that workers act irrationally, (in the économie 
sensé). In this section we will summarise the main hypothèses which 
hâve been associated with thèse two bodies of theory. 
NEOCLASSICAL THEORY 
The fundamental hypothesis underlying neoclassical wage theory is 
that in a compétitive labour market for homogeneous workers (and 
homogeneous work places), wage rates will tend to be equalised in the 
long-run as long as both employers and workers possess perfect infor-
mation and as long as workers do not expérience costs in moving 
between firms. Intra-market wage differentials are then explained in 
neoclassical theory by relaxing many of the assumptions implicit in this 
hypothesis. 
Adam Smith was the first to perceive that it was not money wage 
rates which would tend to equality in a compétitive labour market, but 
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the «whole of the advantages and disadvantages of employments.»8 
If employment conditions (including wage rates) in one firm were 
observed to be relatively more or less attractive than those in the others, 
the supply of workers to that firm would increase in the first case or 
decrease in the second, until the net attractiveness of the same job in 
ail firms was equated. This leads to the following neoclassical hypothèses 
concerning sources of wage differentials between firms in the same 
labour market : 
Hypothesis I : wage rates will be lowest in those firms which offer 
the highest level of fringe benefits. 
Hypothesis II : wage rates will be lower, the greater is the intrinsic 
satisfaction derived from the job and the more pleasant are working 
conditions. 
Hypothesis III : hourly wage rates may be higher for hours worked 
outside of the «preferred» hours of 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. Monday to Friday 
than for hours worked in that period. 
Hypothesis IV: monthly wage rates will be higher the greater are 
the number of hours worked during a month. 
Hypothesis V: to the extent that a majority of workers may 
prefer to work in one geographical area (or set of areas) rather than 
others, the firms in that area may be able to attract workers even though 
they pay lower wages than firms in other areas. 
A second source of wage differentials was elaborated on by Alfred 
Marshall. He argued that after the net advantages of différent employ-
ments were accounted for, compétition theory predicted that there 
would be a tendency towards equality of earaings per unit of work per-
formed, or what he referred to as efficiency eamings.9 That is, accord-
ing to this hypothesis observed wage variations should be approximated 
by ratios of workers' marginal productivités, ceteris paribus. This leads 
to the following hypothèses : 
Hypothesis VI : wage rates will increase with increased éducation 
and training. 
Hypothesis VII: wages rates will increase with increased expé-
rience. 
8
 Adam SMITH, The Wealth of Nations, Book 1, Chapter 10, edited by A. Skin-
ner, Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1973, pp. 202-208. 
9
 A. MARSHALL, Principles of Economies, Macmillan, London, 1938, p. 549. 
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Hypothesis VIII: wage rates will be an increasing function of 
intelligence and physical aptitude. 
Following from the work of George Stigler, a number of authors 
hâve suggested that wage differentials may persist in those labour markets 
in which the participants are not well-informed about market wage rates 
and working conditions.10 Thus, we hâve: 
Hypothesis IX: persistent wage differentials may be observed 
when workers or employers are poorly-informed about wage and em-
ployaient conditions in the market. 
Furthermore, Stigler has also argued that in some situations 
employers may view wages and employée search costs (including 
sélection, recruitment, and training costs) as substitutes, with high-wage 
firms attempting to maintain lower turnover rates and attract a given 
quality of workers with lower recruitment costs than low-wage firms 
who must search for replacements more often and use higher-cost 
recruitment channels.11 Thus: 
Hypothesis X : some firms may offer higher-than-average wages 
in order to reduce turnover rates and recruitment costs. 
Hypothesis XI: firms which are expanding the size of their labour 
forces may raise their wages in an effort to reduce the recruitment 
costs which are associated with short-run inelasticities in the supply of 
labour. 
Finally, although the présence of collusive or monopolistic forces 
within the labour market may not be consistent with the neoclassical 
theory of compétitive labour markets, they are consistent with the 
neoclassical assumptions concerning the rationality of the économie 
actors. Therefore, on the supply side, it is not inconsistent with the 
neoclassical theory of the labour market for profit-maximising employers 
to deal with trade unions. In thèse cases, if less than 100 percent of the 
workers in a labour market are unionised there may be no tendency for 
union and non-union wages to be equalized. Similarly, on the demand 
side, a profit-maximising firm may be able to obtain monopsonistic 
dominance over a labour market. If it used this power to discriminate 
between employées, wage differentials may be established which will 
hâve no tendency to be reduced. That is: 
10
 cf. G. STIGLER, «Information in the Labour Market», M. R. FISHER, 
«Search in Labor Markets...», and L. J. MIRMAN and W. R. PORTER, «A Micro-
economic Model of the Labour Market Under Uncertainty ». 
11
 lbid. 
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Hypothesis XII: unionised and non-unionised workers within the 
same labour market may receive différent wage rates. 
Hypothesis XIII\ monopsonistic employers may use their power 
to practice wage discrimination among their employées. 
INSTITUTION AL THEORY 
Institutional models identify a second set of wage-determining 
forces, which are inconsistent with the basic neoclassical assumption 
that market participants continually maximise profits or net économie 
advantages. However, thèse models do not suggest that market behav-
iour is mainly undirected or chaotic; rather it is often assumed that 
participants' actions are governed by other goals considered to be 
equally or relatively more important than pecuniary gain. 
One of the most frequently mentioned hypothèses associated with 
the institutionalist viewpoint is that wages will be higher in large firms 
than is warranted by worker quality différences or greater search 
costs. The rationale offered for this behaviour is that ownership may 
become increasingly divorced from control as firms become larger, re-
sulting in a situation in which large firms will be dominated by their 
managerial staffs. To the extent that managers are less interested in 
profit-maximisation than are the owners (shareholders) thèse firms' pri-
mary goals may no longer be to maximise profits. In particular, the 
managers of thèse firms may be much more inclined to distribute 
revenue to their workers, in the form of increased wages, than the 
profit-maximisation hypothesis would predict.12 Accordingly : 
Hypothesis XIV: the larger is the size of a firm, the higher will be 
the wages that it will pay. 
A closely-related hypothesis is that the wage rates which a firm 
pays will be positively correlated with its profitability. The cirgument 
which is made in this case is that when économie profits are being earned 
those who are responsible for personnel relations may direct some 
portion of those profits into wages and fringe benefits in order to 
«buy» a réduction in industrial unrest. u In particular, as the firm's 
12
 For an excellent analysis of the goals of managers, see: R. L. MARRIS, The 
Economie Theory of «Managerial Capitalism », Basic Books, New York, 1964, pp. 46-109. 
13
 cf. L. G. REYNOLDS, The Structure of Labor Markets, Harper and Brothers, 
New York, 1951, pp. 162-166; D. I. MACKAY, et. al., Labour Markets Under Différent 
Employment Conditions, p. 391 ; A. REES and G. P. SHULTZ, Workers and Wages in an 
Urban Labor Market, p. 7; and D. G. BROWN, «Inter-industry Wage Structure in 
Manufacturing », Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 16, No. 1, October 1962, 
pp. 45-46. 
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owners can be expected tojudge the firm's financial success by compar-
ing its profits with the profits of other firms in the same industry, we 
hypothesize that : 
Hypothesis XV: the more profitable is a firm relative to other 
firms in the same industry, the higher will be its wage scale. 
A similar argument, following from the previous one, is that 
product market monopolists, having profits which are higher than 
normal, will pay above average wage rates.14 
Hypothesis XVI: product market monopolists will pay higher 
wage s than compétitive firms. 
Finally, to the extent that managers are more aware of their 
counterparts within the same industry than within other industries, the 
désire for peer approval may induce a degree of industry wage conform-
ity which is not related to labour market forces.15 Hence: 
Hypothesis XVII: inter-firm wage differentials may resuit from 
intra-industry wage patterns which are not responsive to the forces of 
the labour market.16 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Our purpose in writing this paper was to test the assumption 
made in the job search literature that workers searching for jobs in 
compétitive, non-unionised labour markets would be faced with persistent 
wage differentials. Ideally, therefore, we would hâve liked to hâve iden-
tified a perfectly compétitive labour market in which ail workers and 
ail jobs were completely homogeneous and then to hâve observed the 
conditions under which wage differentials (if any) were generated in 
that market. 
14
 cf. A. REES and G. SHULTZ, Workers and Wages in an Urban Labor 
Market, p. 7; L. W. WEISS, «Concentration and Labor Earnings», American Economie 
Review, Vol. 56, No. 1, March 1966, p. 99; and R. A. LESTER, «A Range Theory of 
Wage Differentials», Industrial and Labour Relations Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, July 1952, 
p. 485. 
15
 cf. N. W. CHAMBERLAIN and J. W. K U H N , Collective Bargaining, 
Second Edition, McGraw-Hill, Toronto, 1965, pp. 222-231 ; L. W. WEISS, «Concentration 
and Labor Earnings», p. 99; and L. G. REYNOLDS, «Wage Différences in Local Labor 
Markets», American Economie Review, Vol. 36, No. 3, June 1946, p. 366. 
16
 cf. L. W. WEISS, «Concentration and Labor Earnings», p. 99; L. G. REY-
NOLDS, The Structure of Labour Markets, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1951, 
p. 157; and P. KUMAR, Relative Wage Differentials in Canadian Industries, Queen's 
University, Kingston, Ontario, 1974, p. 9. 
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However, no such market exists. Accordingly, we attempted to 
choose a labour market which reflected the homogeneous, compétitive 
idéal of the job search literature as closely as possible. The market 
investigated was that for clerk-typists in the central business district of 
Calgary, Alberta. 
This market was chosen for a number of reasons. First,, within 
this market there are a large number of workers performing essentially 
the same set ot tasks.17 In our survey we included only those jobs 
which involved copy typing and routine clérical work and excluded 
those which involved the use of shorthand or the opération of a switch-
board.) Second, as the central business district of Calgary is very 
compact and easily accessible from ail parts of the city, the market 
cannot be said to be divided in a géographie sensé. Finally, the length 
of the work week, the cyclicality of employment, and the provision of 
such perquisites as coffee breaks, vacations, and sick leave are fairly 
standard across firms in this market. Thus, this market reflects, perhaps 
as closely as any, the assumptions of a perfectly compétitive labour 
market. 
In order to collect the necessary data, 10 percent of ail firms in the 
central business district were contrated. 92 firms indicated that they 
employed one or more clerk-typists. Of thèse, 73 (79 percent) agreed 
to allow us to interview them.18 The data was then gathered by verbally 
administering two questionnaires in each firm. The first of thèse was 
given to a clerk-typist and was used to détermine personal characteristics 
such as âge, sex, éducation, and expérience.19 The second questionnaire 
was given simultaneously to the clerk-typist's supervisor. This question-
naire was used to identify various aspects of the firm's wage policy. 
Unfortunately, constraints of time and money prevented us from 
returning to the same firms in order to follow the development of their 
17
 Ex post, we estimated that there were approximately 1400 clerk-typists in 
the central business district. 
18
 The small sample size leads to the necessity to interpret with some caution the 
results which follow. However, it should be pointed out (a) that even in the longest of 
our régression équations, 73 observations provides us with 53 degrees of freedom and 
(b) that previous studies in this field hâve also found it necessary, for cost reasons, to 
limit the number of firms interviewed. (R. Evans, in «Worker Quality and Wage Disper-
sion...», interviewed only 20 firms; and A. Rees and G. Shultz, in Workers and Wages 
in an Urban Labor Market, interviewed only 74 firms.) 
19
 For additional information concerning the responses of thèse clerk-typists see: 
C. J. BRUCE and J. H. MARSHALL, «Job Search and Frictional Unemploymenî: 
Some Empirical Evidence», Relations Industrielles\Industrial Relations, Vol. 31, No. 3, 
1976, pp. 402-415. 
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wage policies over a number of years. As a resuit it was not possible to 
détermine directly whether the wage differentials which we observed 
represented an equilibrium situation. However, an analysis of the wages 
of the firms in our sample over the four years preceding our study indi-
cates a remarkable stability in the wage distribution, implying that the 
market in question had approached a long-run equilibrium.20 
The average monthly wage being paid by the 73 firms was $544.27, 
with an inter-decile range of $175. The standard déviation of the dis-
tribution was $70.81, giving a coefficient of variation of 13.01 percent. 
Analysis of the causes of thèse wage differentials proceeded in three 
steps : 
NEOCLASSICAL HYPOTHESES 
First, we wished to détermine the extent to which the neoclassical 
hypothèses could explain the observed wage differentials. Accordingly, 
monthly wages were regressed on eight independent variables. Thèse 
were: 
Fringe Benefits (Hypothesis I) : the employer's estimate of the dollar 
value of non-wage benefits. (The coefficient on this variable was expected 
to hâve a négative sign.) 
Hours Worked (Hypothesis IV): the average number of straight-
time hours worked per month. (A positive corrélation with wages was 
expected.) 
Education (Hypothesis VI) : as ail of the workers interviewed had 
completed high school and none had completed university, it was possible 
to represent éducation through the use of two dummy variables: 
«completed business or technical school», and «completed some 
business or technical school». (This variable was expected to be 
positively correlated with wages.) 
Expérience (Hypothesis VII): the number of months expérience 
which the clerk-typist had in that occupation.21 (A positive corrélation 
with wages was expected.) 
20
 The Spearman rank corrélation coefficient comparing the wage distributions of 
July 1972 and July 1975 was 0.573. This is significant at the 1 percent level. 
21
 Often âge is also used as an independent variable in équations such as this. 
We did not include it, however, as we found it to be highly correlated with expérience. 
Also, a separate variable measuring the clerk-typist's expérience with her présent firm 
was included in the initial régression but its statistical insignificance and the need to 
maintain sufficient degrees of freedom led to a décision to drop the variable in the final 
model. 
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Percentage of Time Typing (Hypothèses VI and VII) : the approxi-
mate percentage of time spent typing (as reported by the clerk-typist) 
was included as a further indication of the productivity of the 
employée. It was our assumption that the more capable was an employée, 
the more varied would be the tasks given to her. Therefore, we hy-
pothesised that, to the extent that an increase in time spent typing would 
reflect a decrease in the variety of tasks performed, this variable would 
be negatively correlated with the wage rate. 
Test of Applicants (Hypothesis X): on the assumption that those 
firms which were following a policy of offering high wages in order to 
attract well-qualified workers would wish to assure themselves of the 
qualifications of their applicants, each firm was asked whether it used a 
testing procédure to screen applicants. A dummy variable, with an 
expected positive sign, was included to indicate whether the firm had 
used such a procédure. 
Changes in Employment (Hypothesis XI): a dummy variable was 
used to indicate whether the firm had increased the number of clerk-
typists which it employed within the last 12 months. (The sign on the 
coefficient was expected to be positive.) 
Union (Hypothesis XII): as 10 of the clerk-typists interviewed 
belonged to unions, (primarily in the public sector), a dummy variable 
was used to indicate whether the clerk-typist in question belonged to a 
union. (Again, the sign on this variable was expected to be positive.) 
Hypothèses II, III, IV, VIII, and XIII were not tested as the 
s ample was chosen in such a way that no measurable différences 
among workers or firms were observed with respect to thèse variables. 
Hypothesis IX will be tested separately below. 
Logarithms of ail of the quantifiable variables were taken and the 
technique of ordinary least squares was used to regress monthly wage 
rates on the eight variables listed above. The results are summarised in 
Table 1. 
Four variables proved to be significant at the 5 percent level 
(one-tailed test). Thèse were: éducation, expérience, hours worked per 
month, and test of applicants. Surprisingly, neither the fringe benefits 
variable nor the unionisation variable proved to be significant. One 
possible reason for the low corrélations observed between fringe benefits 
and wages may hâve been the difficulty involved in collecting accurate 
data with respect to this variable. However, an alternative explanation 
is that applicants for jobs are so poorly-informed concerning fringe 
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TABLE 1 
Explanation of Monthly Wage Differentials 
Using Neoclassical Variables Only 
Standard 
Independent Variable Coefficient Error t-Statistic 
Constant 2.781 1.389 2.002a 
Education : 
High School only — — — 
Some Business school 0.027 0.035 0.782 
Business school 0.068 0.026 2.640a 
Unionisation of Clerk-typists 
No union 
— — — 
Union 0.045 0.038 1.181 
Test of Applicants 
No test 
— — — 
Test 0.049 0.027 1.831b 
Changes in Employment : 
Stable or decreasing 
— — — 
Increasing - 0.014 0.027 - 0.519 
(In) Months of expérience 0.055 0.010 5.467a 
(In) Percentage of time typing - 0.016 0.015 - 1.061 
(In) Fringe benefits ($/mo.) 0.006 0.018 0.309 
(In) Hours per month 0.656 0.275 2.387 a 
Observations: 73 
R 2 : 0.5288 R2 : 0.4636 
Standard Error: 0.0956 
a Significant at 1 percent level (one-tailed test) 
b Significant at 5 percent level (one-tailed test) 
benefits that it is only earnings net of fringe benefits which tend to be 
equalised across firms. 
As a crude test of this hypothesis, employers and employées in 
our survey were asked, separately, to list the fringe benefits available 
in their firm. Excluding coffee breaks, vacations, and sick leave, which 
were reported universally, the answers to this question are summarised 
in Table 2. The first column in this table indicates the number of times 
that both the employer and the employée responded that a fringe 
benefit was available. The second column indicates the number of times 
that only the employer responded and the third column indicates the 
number of cases in which only the employée responded. The employées 
were also asked whether there were any fringe benefits which they 
did not receive but would like to receive. The final column in Table 2 
indicates the number of cases in which employées indicated that they 
would « like to hâve» a fringe benefit which they were already receiving. 
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TABLE 2 
Number of Fringe Benefits Indicated by Employers and Employées 
Fringe Benefit 1 Mentioned by «Incorrect » 
Employer and Employer Employée Response 
Employée only only By Employée 
Pension 15 28 — 1 
Life insurance 26 29 
_ 
3 
Médical insurance 29 21 2 6 
Dental plan 3 2 1 
— 
Disability insurance 7 35 
— — 
Drug plan 1 44 
— _ 
Discounts (on Employer' i s product) 2 6 3 
— 
Savings plan 6 3 1 
— 
Stock option 1 3 4 
— 
Social club 1 
— 
5 
— 
Christmas bonus 
— 
2 2 
— 
Profit sharing 
— 
3 
— — 
The data in Table 2 clearly indicates that workers in this occupation 
are not well-informed concerning the number of fringe benefits made 
available to them by their présent employer. We would not expect 
workers who were in the procès s of looking for jobs to be better-
informed. Thus, as the employers interviewed by us would hâve included 
the costs of ail of their fringe benefits in calculating the figure used in our 
régression, and as potential employées could hâve been expected to 
include only a fraction of thèse costs in comparing the net advantages of 
différent employments, the failure of the fringe benefits variable to 
contribute to the explanation of wage differentials was not surprising. 
The unionisation variable may not hâve proven significant because 
the majority of observations in that category came from the public 
sector, where workers won the right to certify only very recently. That 
the percentage of time typing variable did not prove to be significant 
may hâve resulted from the fact that typing is viewed as an onerous 
task relative to the other duties performed by clerk-typists. This may 
resuit in some flrms paying high wages to those employées who spend 
the greatest amount of time typing. Finally, the lack of significance of 
the variable which measures changes in the firm's employment was not 
surprising in the sensé that many other authors hâve found the same 
resuit. The most plausible reason for the low t-statistic on this variable 
would seem to be that none of the «expanding » firms had added more 
than two clerk-typists. In a compétitive labour market, such as the one 
being investigated hère, such a small change in employment should not 
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cause «expanding » firms to encounter any greater supply inelasticities 
than would be encountered by firms which were just replacing normal 
labour turnover. 
INSTITUTIONAL HYPOTHESES 
To détermine the explanatory power of the institutional theory, 
the équation summarised in Table 1 was re-estimated with the addition 
of proxies for the four institutional hypothèses listed in the first section 
of this paper. The proxies used were : 
Total Employment of Firm (Hypothesis XIV) : dummy variables 
representing employment levels of 50-449 workers and 500 or more 
workers were used to represent the size of the firm. (A positive cor-
relation with wages was expected.) 
Profitability ofFirm (Hypothesis XV): in the absence of any précise 
data on the profitability of the firms in our sample — many firms were 
privately-owned and therefore did not publish financial data — we asked 
each employer to characterise profits in his firm relative to the rest of 
his industry as «high», «average», or «low». Dummy variables were 
used to represent the latter two responses as well as «don't know», or 
«not applicable», as in the case of government employées. (The coef-
ficients on thèse variables were expected to hâve négative signs as 
«high profits» was used as the référence category.) 
Degree of Concentration (Hypothesis XVI): a dummy variable 
representing the estimated number of product market competitors was 
used as a proxy for the degree of industry concentration. (This variable 
was expected to be positively correlated with wages.) 
Industry Affiliation (Hypothesis XVII): five industry groups were 
identified: petroleum, government, insurance, finance, and «other». As 
the petroleum industry is generally assumed to pay the highest wages in 
Calgary, it was used as a référence category and the other industries 
were entered as dummy variables. (The signs on the coefficients of thèse 
variables were expected to be négative.) 
The resulting équation is summarised in Table 3. Five of the 
variables in this équation proved to be significant at the 5 percent leveL 
Three of thèse — éducation, expérience, and hours worked — are 
associated with neoclassical theory. However, two of the significant 
variables are associated with the institutional body of theory. The first 
of thèse, the industry affiliation variable, proved to be significant in the 
sensé that firms in both the financial sector and in «other» industries, 
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(including retail firms, employment bureaus, and real estate agencies), 
paid lower wages than did firms in the petroleum industry, ceteris 
paribus. 
The size of the firm, as measured by the number of employées, also 
proved to be significant but did not hâve the expected sign. The institu-
tional theory leads us to expect that wages will increase with firm size. 
But Table 3 clearly indicates that in this market, firms with 50-499 
employées pay lower wages than firms with fewer than 50 employées. 
This would be consistent with neoclassical theory if employées could be 
shown to hâve a strong préférence for firms with 50-499 employées. 
However, when the clerk-typists in our survey were asked what size of 
firm they would prefer to work for, a préférence was shown for firms of 
approximately 50 employées. (The mean preferred size was 59.5 em-
ployées, while the médian preferred size was 48.)22 Thus, an explanation 
of the négative sign on the 50-499 employées variable would hâve to be 
based upon some alternative hypothesis. One possible hypothesis is 
that the close, personal contact between employer and employées in 
very small firms (less than 50 employées) may make the employer 
responsive to wage requests which are based on non-market criteria, 
thereby resulting in those firms paying relatively high wages. Therefore, 
there may be a middle range of firms, in which the employment relation-
ship has become depersonalised, where wages will fall below those paid 
by small firms. Only as firms increase in size beyond this middle range 
will wages begin to rise again. This hypothesis is partially supported by 
our findings as the sign on the coefficient for large firms is positive, 
(although not significant). 
The coefficients on the concentration and profitability variables 
were also insignificant. A possible reason for the lack of significance 
of thèse variables was their statistical interdependence. 
Finally, it is important to note that the addition of the four institu-
tional variables improved the explanatory power of the régression signi-
ficantly. The R2 statistic increased from .53 in the first équation to .70 in 
the second; while the adjusted R2 (R2) rose from .46 to .59.23 Thus, 
there would appear to be strong évidence to indicate that institutional 
22
 J. H. MARSHALL, Job-Search Behavior in a Centralized Market for 
Homogeneous Labour, Unpublished MA Thesis, University of Calgary, 1969, p. 69. 
23
 An F-test was used to détermine whether the increase in the explanatory 
power of the second régression was significant. The resulting F-statistic of 2.71 proved 
to be significant at the 1 percent level. 
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factors are operative in the détermination of wage differentials in this 
labour market. 
INFORMATIONAL VARIABLES 
One neoclassical hypothesis which was not tested in the équations 
reported in Tables 1 and 3 was the hypothesis that wage differentials 
may be related to the amount of information possessed by the partici-
pants in the labour market (Hypothesis IX). The main reason for 
excluding this variable from the régression analysis was that the effect of 
the absence of information on wage rates is not unidirectional. That is, 
the expected effect of a lack of information is not to either raise or 
lower the wage rate but to cause the wage rate to differ from the market-
determined wage. 
To test this hypothesis, therefore, it was first necessary to calculate 
the wage rate which the market would dictate that the firm «should» 
by paying and then to compare this with the wage rate which the firm 
was actually paying. Hypothesis IX would then lead us to predict that 
the absolute différence between thèse two wage rates would be inversely 
correlated with the amount of information possessed by the firm. 
As a proxy for the market-determined wage rate we used the 
expected wage rates given by the régression reported in Table 3. The 
absolute values of the residuals derived from this régression then served 
as a measure of the différence between the actual and the market wage 
rates. 
In order to dérive a proxy for the amount of labour market infor-
mation possessed by each firm we asked whether it attempted « ...to be 
familiar with wages offered to clerk-typists by other firms in [Calgary] » 
and, if so, « ...how [it obtained] this information... ». Those firms answer-
ing that they attempted to remain familiar with local wages through the 
use of surveys — for example, government and trade association 
surveys — were considered to be well-informed ; while those who made 
no effort to remain informed or who relied on informai sources, were 
considered to be poorly-informed.24 
Our null hypothesis was then that the absolute values of the wage 
residuals for those firms which were (by our définition) poorly-informed 
would not be greater (on average) than those for the firms which were 
well-informed. To test this hypothesis a t-statistic was formed to compare 
24
 On this basis, 39 firms were found to be well-informed and 34 to be poorly-
informed. 
TABLE 3 
Explanation of Monthly Wage Differentials Using 
Both Institutionai and Neoclassical Variables 
Independent Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t-Statistic 
Constant 3.880 1.297 2.992 a 
Education 
High School only 
— — — 
Some business school .013 .032 0.400 
Business school .077 .023 3.326a 
Unionisation of Clerk-typists 
No union 
— — — 
Union .138 .096 1.441 
Test of Applicants 
No test 
— — — 
Test .018 .026 0.705 
Changes in Employment 
Stable or decreasing 
— — — 
Increasing - .028 .027 -1.066 
(In) Months of Expérience .059 .009 6.448 a 
(In) Percentage of Time Typing - .004 .014 -0.278 
(In) Fringe Benefits .002 .020 0.112 
(In) Hours Worked .450 .256 1.757 b 
Industry Affiliation 
Petroleum 
— — — 
Government - .123 .099 -1.245 
Insurance - .055 .046 -1.198 
Finance - .116 .040 -2 .900 a 
Other - .102 .029 -3.450 a 
Number of Product Market Competitors 
Less than 10 
10 or more 
Total Employment of Firm 
Less than 50 
50-499 
Over 500 
Profitability of Firm 
High 
Average 
Low 
Don't know 
.032 .027 1.216 
.087 .036 -2.406 
.024 .037 0.666 
.023 .031 -0.740 
.050 .044 -1.167 
.035 .042 -0.834 
Observations: 73 
R2 : 0.7012 R2 
Standard Error 
: 0.5941 
0.0831 
a Significant at 1 percent level (one-tailed test) 
b Significant at 5 percent level (one-tailed test) 
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the means of the two sets of residuals.25 The value of this statistic 
proved to be 1.730, indicating that the null hypothesis was rejected at 
the 5 percent level of significant (one-tailed test). Thus, we conclude 
that there is évidence to support the hypothesis that significant wage 
differentials may be generated in those situations in which firms are 
poorly-informed about labour market conditions. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we hâve contributed to the literature on wage dif-
ferentials in a number of différent ways : 
First, due to lack of information, most previous studies hâve been 
restricted to inter-industry data and to data which deals primarily with 
the manufacturing sector. By using a questionnaire technique to gather 
our information we hâve been able to provide évidence on wage dif-
ferentials at the inter-firm level for both the manufacturing and non-
manufacturing sectors. This évidence has been used to re-test many of 
the hypothèses put forward in earlier studies. 
Secondly, we hâve been able to provide évidence with respect to 
a number of hypothèses which had not previously been tested rigorously. 
We hâve shown, for example, that in the Calgary labour market for 
clerk-typists, there is no statistical support for the hypothesis that the 
wage rate which a firm pays will be related to the use of tests to screen 
applicants. Also, of particular importance is the évidence which we hâve 
provided to indicate that both the size of a firm and its knowledge of 
labour market conditions will significantly influence its décisions con-
cerning the wage rates which it will pay. Furthermore, we hâve shown 
that the poor performance of the fringe benefits variable in explaining 
wage differentials in this market may be due to the lack of information 
possessed by workers concerning the fringe benefits available to them. 
Finally, we were able to test the hypothesis that variables asso-
ciated with the institutional body of theory are capable of contributing 
to the explanation of the observed wage differentials. We found both 
that the institutional variables improved the percentage of wage devia-
25
 u0 - ui 
t = . 
/ ( n 0 - l )S 0 2 + (n i - D S ^ / l + 1 
V n0 + ni - 2 V n0 ni 
where ûi is the mean of séries i, ni is the number of observations in séries i, si2 is the 
variance of séries i, i = 0 indicates the residuals associated with the poorly-informed 
firms, and i = 1 indicates the residuals associated with the well-informed firms. 
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tions explained from 46 percent to 59 percent and that the firm size 
and industry affiliation variables were statistically significant. One im-
portant implication of this finding is that when institutional forces 
influence the wage distribution, it becomes possible that wage differentials 
will exist even in those cases in which both workers and employment 
opportunities are seen to be homogeneous. We may conclude, there-
fore, that job search théories which require the existence of persistent 
wage differentials may reflect the opération of actual labour markets — 
to the extent that thèse théories are consistent with the institutional 
approach to the modelling of the labour market. 
Les sources de différences de salaire dans un marché de 
concurrence 
Peu d'études ont été faites pour expliquer pourquoi, dans un marché du 
travail localisé, les différences de salaire sont si grandes et si persistantes, si 
ce n'est qu'elles résultent d'un manque d'information tant de la part des travail-
leurs que des employeurs. À partir de cette hypothèse peu justifiée, l'étude 
ci-dessus rend compte d'une enquête instituée auprès de dactylos et de leurs 
employeurs au sujet de ces différences dans les traitements. 
L'article comprend trois parties: la première partie traite de ce qui s'est 
écrit sur la caractérisation des différences de salaire ; la seconde décrit la nature 
de l'enquête et en analyse les résultats; la dernière, enfin, dégage quelques 
conclusions de ce qu'elle a révélé. 
Deux théories existent relativement aux causes des différences de salaire. 
La première, qu'on désigne sous le nom de «théorie néo-classique» repose 
sur l'hypothèse que les entreprises cherchent à maximaliser les profits et les 
travailleurs à maximaliser les avantages économiques. La seconde théorie est 
dite «théorie institutionnelle» et elle repose sur le fait que les employeurs ne 
cherchent pas à maximaliser les profits ou que les travailleurs agissent d'une 
façon non rationnelle dans le sens économique du terme. 
Selon la première théorie, dans une situation de marché concurrentiel, les 
taux de salaire ont tendance à s'égaliser au bout du compte en autant qu'em-
ployeurs et travailleurs disposent d'une information parfaite et que les salariés 
n'ont pas expérimenté les coûts de la mutation d'une entreprise à l'autre. Ce ne 
sont pas les taux de salaire qui ont tendance à s'équilibrer, mais l'ensemble 
des avantages et des inconvénients de l'emploi, d'où toute une série d'hypo-
thèses : 1° les taux de salaire seraient plus bas dans les entreprises qui accordent 
plus d'avantages sociaux; 2° les salaires seraient plus bas là où l'on retire plus 
de satisfaction du travail et où l'on trouve des conditions plus agréables; 3° les 
taux de salaire seraient plus élevés lorsque le travail ne s'effectue pas pendant 
les heures normales; 4° plus le traitement mensuel est élevé, plus les heures 
de travail sont longues; 5° si les salariés préfèrent travailler dans un territoire 
donné plutôt que dans un autre, ils seront davantage attirés par les entreprises 
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de ce territoire, même si les traitements sont moindres; 6° considéré sous 
d'autres aspects, les taux de salaire augmenteraient en fonction du degré de sco-
larité; 7° ils augmenteraient aussi selon le niveau d'expérience; 8° ils augmen-
teraient encore en fonction de l'intelligence et des aptitudes physiques du tra-
vailleur; 9° sur un autre plan, on peut observer des différences de salaire 
persistantes lorsque les salariés ou les employeurs sont peu informés des salaires 
et des conditions de travail sur le marché; 10° un certain nombre d'entreprises 
paient des salaires plus élevés afin de réduire le taux de roulement de la main-
d'œuvre et d'abaisser le coût du recrutement; 11° les sociétés en état de crois-
sance peuvent augmenter les salaires afin de réduire le coût du recrutement; 
12° enfin, d'un autre point de vue, des salariés syndiqués et des salariés non 
syndiqués, à l'intérieur d'un même marché, peuvent toucher des traitements dif-
férents; 13° un employeur en situation de monopole peut utiliser son pouvoir 
pour établir de la discrimination parmi ses employés. 
Selon la théorie dite institutionnelle, d'autres facteurs seraient à l'œuvre 
qui sont incompatibles avec le postulat de la théorie néoclassique selon lequel 
les participants tendraient toujours à maximiliser les profits et les avantages 
économiques nets. Suivant cette deuxième théorie, les salaires seraient plus éle-
vés que ne le justifient les différences de qualité et le coût plus considérable 
dans les grandes entreprises du recrutement. La raison en serait que, à mesure 
que les entreprises s'agrandissent, il y a dissociation entre les propriétaires 
et les dirigeants, ceux-ci étant moins enclins à maximaliser les profits et, par 
le fait même, portés à en distribuer les revenus aux salariés sous forme d'aug-
mentation des salaires ; d'où l'hypothèse : 14° plus une entreprise est considérable, 
plus les salaires sont élevés. De plus, il peut arriver aussi que les responsables 
du personnel puissent distribuer une partie des profits en salaires ou en avantages 
sociaux, surtout s'ils estiment que les profits de l'entreprise se comparent avec 
ceux d'autres sociétés dans la même entreprise, d'où l'hypothèse suivante: 
15° plus une entreprise réalise de profits par rapport aux autres dans une même 
industrie, plus l'échelle des salaires sera élevée. La même remarque s'applique 
également aux entreprises monopolisant un marché: 16° l'entreprise qui détient 
le monopole d'un marché paie des salaires plus élevés que les entreprises 
concurrentes. Enfin, une dernière hypothèse: 17° les différences de salaire à 
l'intérieur d'une entreprise peuvent résulter d'écarts dans les grilles de salaire 
à l'intérieur de l'industrie sans que les forces en présence sur le marché du 
travail n'en soient responsables. 
L'auteur a ensuite tenté de vérifier un certain nombre des hypothèses 
précédentes, tant celles de la «théorie néo-classique» que celle de la «théorie 
institutionnelle» auprès du marché des dactylos dans le centre des affaires de 
Calgary en Alberta après avoir pris contact avec dix pour cent des entreprises. 
Pour les fins de l'enquête, 92 entreprises employaient une ou plusieurs dactylos 
et 73 ont permis de procéder à l'entrevue à partir de deux questionnaires, 
l'un s'adressant aux dactylos pour connaître leurs caractéristiques personnelles 
et l'autre, à leurs surveillants, pour s'enquérir de la politique salariale des 
entreprises. 
Au moyen de cette enquête, il s'agissait de savoir dans quelle mesure les 
hypothèses de l'une et de l'autre théories pouvaient expliquer les différences 
de salaire. 
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Des résultats de cette enquête, l'auteur dégage les conclusions suivantes. 
En premier lieu, par l'utilisation d'un questionnaire technique pour recueil-
lir les informations, il a été possible d'obtenir des données sur les différences 
de salaire entre les sociétés à la fois dans le secteur secondaire et le secteur 
tertiaire. 
Deuxièmement, il a été également possible de vérifier un certain nombre 
des hypothèses qui ne l'avaient pas été encore, du moins d'une façon rigou-
reuse. Par exemple, en ce qui concerne les dactylos de Calgary, l'hypothèse 
suivant laquelle les taux de salaire payés par une firme seraient reliés à l'utilisa-
tion de tests d'embauchage ne se justifie pas statistiquement. De même, on s'est 
rendu compte que l'importance de l'entreprise et sa connaissance des conditions 
du marché du travail ont une influence significative sur les décisions prises en 
matière de salaire. De plus, il a été démontré que le peu d'importance de la 
variable des avantages sociaux pour expliquer les différences de salaire peut être 
occasionnée par un manque d'information. 
En troisième lieu, il a été démontré que les hypothèses selon lesquelles 
les variables se rattachant à la théorie dite institutionnelle peuvent contribuer 
à l'explication des différences de salaire observées. On y a découvert que 
lorsque les forces institutionnelles influencent les taux de salaire, il est possible 
que des différences existent même là où la qualité de la main-d'œuvre et les 
occasions d'emploi paraissent uniformes. 
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